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INTRODUCTION

HE dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution I has once again proved a stumbling block for environmen-

* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. A.B., Bryn Mawr
College; MA., Ph.D., University of Toronto; J.D., University of Chicago. The author wishes to thank Winkfield Twyman, Michal Belknap, Margaret Gilhooley,
Michael Zimmer and Paul Hauge for their comments and suggestions and Christine McAteer and Larissa Rachko for their research assistance.
1. The United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3. This constitutional provision arose from trade difficulties under the
Articles of Confederation; see THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 267-68 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A very material object of this power was the relief of
the States which import and export through other States from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade
between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load
the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction,
with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the
former."). Even in the absence of a federal statute, the Commerce Clause can
restrict state regulation; this "dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause is a judgemade doctrine. See Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)
("Although the Clause speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the
Court has long recognized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.").

(645)
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tal solutions to liquid waste disposal and solid waste flow control
alike, because the financing on which these projects depends is so
precarious. This article examines the effect of the United States
Supreme Court's current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence on the law and decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the important waste recycling area. It
concludes that the dormant Commerce Clause should not be interpreted to require dismantling current environmental, health and
safety programs built up in response to serious problems and federal mandates. The specter of dismantlement arises because of the
identification of the dormant Commerce Clause with the profit
motivations of corporations formed to provide basic, unspecialized
recycling services that were allocated, along with highly technical,
expensive services, to one municipally-designated recycling company that undertook to build a state-of-the-art waste facility.
In 1978, New Jersey environmental law, designed to cope with
waste when space in New Jersey landfills became scarce, was
changed dramatically by the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Philadelphiav. New Jersey.2 In that case, the Court held unconstituEver since 1824, the Justices of the Supreme Court have viewed congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce as a limitation on the regulatory authority
of the states. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (involving congressional statute that was evenhanded in its effect). These limitations on the permissible effects of statutes developed into the dormant Commerce Clause
subsequently referred to by the Court. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 250 (1829) ("We do not think that the act empowering the
Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all
the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the
subject.").
2. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). City of Philadelphia invalidated a New Jersey statute
which prohibited the import of liquid wastes collected outside NewJersey's territorial limits. Id. at 629. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of a regulation is
not controlling when determining whether the regulation is protectionist for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause and stated that solid waste was an article
of commerce. Id. at 626-27. City of Philadelphiareversed Hackensack Meadowlands
Development Commission Authority v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill, 348 A.2d 505,
519 (N.J. 1975), which had upheld a NewJersey statute banning disposal of out-ofstate waste in New Jersey. The New Jersey statute, however, did not prohibit New
Jersey waste from going out of state. Id. at 508 & n.2. The original suit had been
motivated by landfill owners and operators who wanted to sell the space to Philadelphia and feared financial ruin if they lost the business of the City of Philadelphia. See generally Note, Solving New Jersey's Solid Waste Problem Constitutionally-orFilling the Great Silences with Garbage, 32 RUTGERS L. Rv. 741, 742-47 (1979) (discussing both Hackensack Meadows and City of Philadelphiadecisions). Later, Kinsley
Landfill had to be closed to Philadelphia waste by injunction because the landfill
lacked room for the waste. Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd., 495
A.2d 49, 58-59, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008, and aff'g 488 A.2d 562 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985); see Comment, Trial Court Order Barring the City of Philadelphiafrom
DumpingSolid Waste at Kinsley Landfill in New Jersey is Not an UnconstitutionalBurden
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tional a state statute that had permitted, because of limited space,
certain NewJersey landfills including Kinsley Landfill to accept only
in-state trash.3 Notwithstanding the Court's decision that the statute was unconstitutional, the Kinsley Landfill eventually refused to
accept Philadelphia waste because of the scarcity of space at that
site, as well as at hundreds of other landfills. 4 State environmental
laws of this type might be deemed a centrally important building
block in today's federalism, yet the Court held that the state law fell
afoul of that manifestation of federalism, the dormant Commerce
5
Clause, which has been called the "charter of free trade."
On Interstate Commerce, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 363, 364 (1986) (discussing Glassborocourt's
conclusion that Kinsley Landfill's closure to Philadelphia did not violate Commerce Clause); see also Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution:JudicialActivism, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and The Federal Mantra,71 OR. L. REv. 409, 411
(1992) (discussing use of dormant Commerce Clause "in the context of a state's
right to protect its environment and barriers to vindication of such rights").
The Supreme Court continued the position it developed in City of Philadelphia
in two subsequent cases. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't
of Nat'l Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 355 (1992) (holding unconstitutional Michigan
statute that prohibited private landfill operators from accepting, solid waste that
originated outside county in which their facility was located); Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336 (1992) (holding that Alabama's stateimposed disposal fee on hazardous wastes generated outside state but disposed of
at facility in-state violated Commerce Clause); see also Allen J. Danzig, The Commerce
Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal: New Jersey's Options After the PhiladelphiaDecision,
11 Rur.-CAm. L.J. 31 (1979) (providing analysis and discussing future effects of
Supreme Court's decision in City of Philadelphia).
3. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 618-19.
4. Glassboro, 495 A.2d at 58. Closures like the Kinsley Landfill were not uncommon. In Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reproduced some of the historical background to the
waste crisis from a summary of a New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy Report:
By the early 1980s, the department had closed, or was in the process of
closing, over 300 unsafe or unregulated landfills that posed serious environmental hazards or had exhausted capacity. However, the department's persistent actions to implement rigorous environmental standards
on landfill construction and operations, coupled with a steady influx of
millions of tons of waste annually from neighboring states during the
1970s, resulted in a serious shortfall of disposal capacity in the state ....
Id. at 704-05.
5. Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document: A Symposium
Commemorating the Bicentennialof the United States Constitution,56 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
4, 17 (1987). The Commerce Clause is a feature of the federal system; in libertarian terms, the Commerce Clause is a charter for free trade and deals not with
personal, but economic liberties because the dormant Commerce Clause forbids
"states to erect barriers to interstate commerce unless Congress authorizes them."
Id. In addition to the dormant Commerce Clause, Judge Posner lists other constitutional devices for promoting interstate commerce, such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States") and the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment ("nor shall private property be taken for public
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Equally significant is the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in C
& A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,6 which reversed the longstanding flow control law of the Third Circuit 7 as well as case law in
New Jersey,8 Pennsylvania 9 and Delaware.' 0 In Carbone, the local
use, without just compensation"). Id. at 17-18. In addition, the Tenth Amendment, which reserves undelegated powers to the states, necessarily deals with federalism. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) ("Most of our recent
cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have concerned the authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws."); Calvin R. Massey,
State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 73
(1989) ("The Tenth Amendment is treated as a statement that states possess
residual sovereign powers, but the extent of those sovereign powers is measured by
the area left for state action after Congress has validly exercised its delegated powers."); see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAw 25 (rev.
ed. 1979) (discussing federalism and asserting that our federal system has basis in
political structure of national government). Professor Black argues that antidiscrimination fits into the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 65. Significantly,
the decisions of the Supreme Court involving dormant Commerce Clause analysis
run counter to the promotion of federalism in two recent cases, United States v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
6. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
7. Id. at 1680. In Carbone, the article of commerce was not solid waste but the
processing and disposing of the solid waste. Id.
8. See Deborah T. Poritz, NewJersey's Approach: Regulation of Waste Flows-Control of Rates, in MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE: DISPOSAL STRATEGIES, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION, AND CONTRACTS AND FINANCING 185, 189 (ALI-ABA Course of Study:
Materials, No. C 355 (1988)) (noting that since 1970, New Jersey has provided
cornerstone legislation to develop long-term options for adequate and safe waste
disposal); see also In re Waste Disposal Agreement, 568 A.2d 547, 554-55 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.) (stating that Department of Environmental Protection's
(DEP) policy against out-of-state disposal was based on health and safety concerns,
areas traditionally regulated by the state under its police powers), cert. denied, 583
A.2d 337 (NJ. 1990); City of Elizabeth v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 486
A.2d 356, 361 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (recognizing difference between
economic protection and solid waste regulation under police power of local and
state governments). Waste Disposal Agreement was not deemed a case of economic
protectionism or economic discrimination. 568 A.2d at 554. The DEP acts under
police power invoked to insure health and safety. Id. "The thrust of New Jersey's
policy is to protect our environment over the long term by insuring the existence
of an essential public service, solid waste disposal, when the critical time and need
arrives." Id. Similarly, the court in In the Matter of Fiorillo Bros. of N.J., Inc., 577
A.2d 1316 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 585 A.2d 371 (N.J. 1990), upheld
New Jersey emergency waste flow orders finding that they did not burden interstate commerce and were designed to accomplish a legitimate state interest by
efficiently removing garbage from New Jersey streets. Id. at 1322-23.
9. See Delaware County v. Raymond T. Opdenaker & Sons, Inc., 652 A.2d 434
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). Delaware County involved a challenge to the county's flow
control ordinance that required all waste generated in the county to be delivered
to designated facilities. Id. at 435 n.1. The court refused to strike down the ordinance because haulers were not going out of state and the county used a bidding
process open to out of state companies. Id. at 437-38. However, Carbone has
caused different outcomes in other Pennsylvania cases. See Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Department of Envt. Resources, 645 A.2d 413, 419 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994) (comparing Carbone and declaring Lehigh County's flow control ordinance
invalid under Pike v. Bruce Church); Tri-County Indus., Inc. v. County of Mercer,
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flow control ordinance directed local waste to the county-designated facility and C & A Carbone, Inc. (C & A Carbone), a light
waste processor, wanted to "cream off" that part of the business
from the designated facility. 1 Again the dormant Commerce
Clause trumped carefully crafted statutes designed to cope with difficult environmental problems and the equally difficult financing of
their solutions.
These two Supreme Court decisions are perhaps most relevant
to the Third Circuit because New Jersey and its Second Circuit
neighbor New York have historically been the largest producers and
exporters of waste. 12 Indeed, C & A Carbone itself, which sought
entry into the Clarkstown market, submitted an amicus brief the
next year in the first case in which the Third Circuit applied Carbone. That case, Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County,' 3 raised essentially the same isNo. 93-592 (W.D. Pa. Oct 12, 1994), rev'd sub nom. Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County
of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995)). In Tni-County, the hauler wanted to bring
waste to an unauthorized site. Id. at 795. The court invalidated the flow control
ordinance for discriminating against interstate commerce. Id. at 796. The court
said that the use of a single site is the issue. Id. at 800. The court further implied
that any processing and disposal program not completely open to competition
could be considered a violation of the Commerce Clause. Id.; see also Southcentral
Pa. Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., 877 F.
Supp. 935, 942 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (memorandum opinion) (applying Carboneanalysis and holding that flow control policy discriminated on its face on basis of origin
of waste because waste generated in county had to be disposed of in county, but
waste generated elsewhere did not).
10. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp.
1369, 1379-80 (D. Del. 1985) (requiring solid waste to use in-state facilities and
stating that regulation is not discriminatory but rather is even-handed).
11. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1680 (1994).
"Cream off" refers to a practice occurring before the development of homogenized milk. In milk making, the cream would rest at the top of the milk container
and the user could remove this rich cream, leaving skim below. Similarly, the unskilled waste processors can attract the customer who needs easily-performed recycling of cardboard by offering a lower price for that simple service. The tax
payers, however, are left with an even higher bill for the more complicated recycling services, because the designated waste facility has been left without the lucrative, easy recycling and the facility is underused.
12. Kirsten Engel, Reconsideringthe NationalMarket in Solid Waste: Trade-offs in
Equity, Efficiency, EnvironmentalProtection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. Riv. 1481,
1490 (1995). In 1992, the net exports of these two states exceeded six million tons,
or 34% of the total quantity of waste that travels in interstate commerce (excluding
the amount of waste shipped to Ontario). Id. Solid waste is exported primarily
from states in the Northeast to states in the Midwest. Id. at 1493. Thus, Blue Circle
Cement v. Board of County Commissioners, 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994), did not
find the flow control ordinance in question discriminatory and remanded for application of the Pike balancing test. Id. at 1512.
13. 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995).
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sues in the Third Circuit as Carbone had in the Supreme Court. 14
While the framing of the legal issue in terms of the dormant Commerce Clause makes it appear that the Supreme Court's requirements are concerned only with commerce and finance, the
environment itself is implicated collaterally, like so much damage
15
from a smartly targeted bomb.
Historically, the waste projects have proven to be financially
risky because the true cost of environmental pollution is not borne
by the polluters themselves but rather is shifted to society at large
through local governments. 16 This financial riskiness requires local
governments to make financial guarantees and security provisions
to build and operate the waste facilities, in turn providing one local
business with assurance that the local waste flow will be processed
through that facility. 17 These security arrangements are placed in
14. See id. at 703-04 (finding that NewJersey's waste flow regulations violated
dormant Commerce Clause). The Atlantic Coast court did not want to invite chaos
into this potentially precarious situation. A preliminary injunction against enforcement of flow control was denied. Id. at 709-10. For further discussion on the Atlantic Coast decision, see infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
The decision in Carbone has effected numerous local judicial decisions. Not
only has Atlantic Coast been remanded by the Third Circuit, but a similar case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey involving
the Borough of Haddon Heights.
15. The military phrase, "collateral" damage from bombs, which we learned
from watching the Gulf War, has to do with the untargeted but often inevitable
result of damage to people caught in the targeted area. The Supreme Court's
framing of the legal issue to protect any would-be entrants to the waste recycling
business, in-state or out-of-state, invites entrants who make the financing of comprehensive waste facilities much more difficult.
16. The complications of this field are legendary and have given rise to an
extensive body of expert, technical literature by economists, scientists, engineers
and cross-disciplinarians, among others. Nevertheless, the courts have had to
make choices when confronted with legal issues arising from business, environmental and zoning disputes involving the disposal of waste, which itself is a technical term invoking disputes. If waste is seen as a raw material then the question may
be analyzed from the point of view that waste facilities need to acquire continuing
supplies of this raw material to run their facilities. On the other hand, the needs
of local governmental municipalities may be analyzed from the point of view of the
police powers of the government to protect the health and safety of the local populace and to assure stability in this area. These competing concerns give rise to
much of the litigation about waste.
17. Eric S. Petersen & David N. Abramowitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control
in the Post-Carbone World, 22 FoRDHim URB. LJ. 361, 364 (1995). Peterson and
Abramowitz discuss financing through a variety of methods: "put-or-pay contracts
between private owner and a local government, to general obligation debt used to
finance the construction of a facility, to project-specific revenue" bonds, or relying
on the delivery of solid waste to the facility to generate revenues to pay off debt or
fulfill the government's delivery obligation under a put or pay contract. Id. at 361.
After legislative flow control ordinances were struck down, the economic stability
of solid waste facilities was in danger, potentially "lead[ing] to increased environmental risks and liabilities for local governments and their taxpayers." Id. at 362.
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jeopardy when they attract the unwelcome inspection of the dormant Commerce Clause as other businesses seek to "cream off" the
lighter recyclables to avail themselves of the same financial guarantees provided for the initial business that is taking care of the waste
18
under the statute in question.
The financial difficulty of the municipalities in erecting full
service waste facilities versus the desire of free-riders to enter the
light recycling business resurfaced in the Atlantic Coast decision,
which applied the analysis developed in Carbone.1 9 Atlantic Coast
was a Pennsylvania corporation formed in 1989 to operate a transfer station and recycling center for construction and demolition (C
& D) debris from buildings.2 0 Atlantic Coast sent its debris to an
Ohio landfill and subsequently pursued status as a designated facility in NewJersey. 21 Atlantic Coast's application was rejected. 22 Furthermore, because tipping fees were high, Atlantic Coast could not
23
afford to enter the New Jersey market in this manner either.
The Third Circuit applied what it called the "heightened scrutiny" discrimination test, familiar from equal protection analysis,
under the influence of Carbone. It therefore abandoned the less
stringent balancing test previously developed by the Court in Pike v.
Congress has recognized that it is necessary to protect the approximately $18 billion in debt, including municipal bonds, that have been invested to manage waste.
140 CONG. REc. H10,307 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994). This could have a profound
impact on the environment if courts prohibit local governmental subsidization of
waste facilities as interference with interstate commerce because a state-of-the-art,
environmentally sound facility cannot compete with an unlined landfill or dump
on a dollar per ton basis. Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does Garbage Have Standing?
Democracy, flow Control and a Principled Constitutional Approach to Municipal Solid
Waste Management, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 157, 255 (1993).
18. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit
Between Equity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 871 (1992) (discussing interstate
transportation of solid waste).
19. Atlantic Coast Demolition and Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1995).
20. Id. at 708. Atlantic Coast processes the construction and demolition debris by separating the recyclable materials from the non-recyclable. Id. The recyclable residue waste is then shipped to landfills for disposal. Id.
21. Id. at 708.
22. Id. Because of its proximity to New Jersey's southern counties, Atlantic
Coast unsuccessfully sought to be included as a designated facility under the New
Jersey plan in order to escape the tipping fees. Id. at 709.
23. Id. "Tipping fees are the rates that a disposal facility or transfer station
charges the hauler who deposits waste at the facility." Id. at 707 n.10 (citation
omitted). The phrase "tipping fees" is used because trucks delivering waste must
"tip" the back-end of the truck to drop off the waste. A transfer station is a facility
that receives unsorted trash, processes it by baling, and sends it onward to disposal
sights like landfills. Id. at 705 n.6.
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Bruce Church24 with respect to Commerce Clause litigation. 25 The
dormant Commerce Clause applies in waste cases because waste
from mixed loads containing both recyclable material and nonrecyclable waste has to be returned to each district's designated facility for separation unless the facility is compensated for lost revenue,
thus interfering with the free flow of trade. 2 6 Additionally, the
Third Circuit rejected the argument that the market participant exemption to dormant Commerce Clause analysis applied to New
27
Jersey.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit, again applying Carbone,has decided two cases involving Pennsylvania flow control ordinances in a
recent consolidated appeal in Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of
Chester.28 Here, the Third Circuit set its focus on the "process" of
designating a single facility for servicing waste in a given local area,
the length of the designation period and the likelihood of designat24. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In Pike, the Supreme Court set forth the balancing
test in Commerce Clause analysis as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits ....
If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142 (citation omitted). For speculation about the meaning of the Third
Circuit's choice of the term "heightened scrutiny" to characterize the Supreme
Court's discrimination test in dormant Commerce Clause analysis, see infra note
59.
25. Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 710. The Atlantic Coast court likened the New
Jersey flow control ordinance to the Clarkstown ordinance in Carbone and concluded that they both favored the district's designated facilities at the expense of
out-of-state providers. Id. at 712. As a result, the Atlantic Coast court found Carbone's "heightened scrutiny" test more appropriate because NewJersey was regulating a market that the Commerce Clause intended to be open. to non-local
competitors. Id.
26. Id. at 707.
27. Id. at 715-17. The Supreme Court has recognized an exception from the
restraints of the dormant Commerce Clause for otherwise discriminatory action
taken by a governmental entity in its role as a market participant, rather than as a
market regulator. Id. at 715-16. "When a governmental entity enters the market
place in a capacity analogous to that of private market participants and makes
decisions analogous to those made by private market participants, its decisions are
not subject to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny." Id. at 715. For further discussion of the market participant exemption, see infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
28. 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995). The statute at issue in Harvey was the Municial Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
4000 (Supp. 1995), which directs each county to plan for the long-term processing and ultimate disposal of its waste. Id. § 4000.303.
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ing an out-of-state provider, and remanded for further proceedings
in light of Atlantic Coast and Harvey & Harvey.29 Unlike Atlantic
Coast, however, Harvey & Harvey had a dissenting opinion de-emphasizing the process used to select the waste service providers because the effect of the flow control ordinance is clearly
30
discriminatory when one waste processing facility is designated.
Heightened scrutiny is, therefore, necessarily demanded.
Thus, two overall concerns arising from the need to deal with
our waste bring about the most recent dormant Commerce Clause
litigation in the Third Circuit. First, the local government must fulfill its ancient function of protecting public health and safety
through its police powers. Therefore, the need for stability in dealing with the never-ending generation of waste in our society and
the concurrent financial difficulties of funding waste services lead
local government to make arrangements covering all waste in the
area under their charge. Once a statutory mechanism with its financial arrangement is in place, the interests of the wider waste
business community, which deals in recyclables and other lighter
aspects of the business, is aroused to provide the less expensive part
of this service.
Second, because the general waste businesses witness an opportunity for great profitability in the business around the new facility,
these less specialized businesses have an incentive to sue under the
dormant Commerce Clause. In this litigation, these private waste
businesses, in effect, are arguing that the government simply cannot look at the waste problem in isolation but must factor into its
projects opportunities for surrounding businesses to participate.
Courts, especially the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit following the Supreme Court, have been hearing their pleas. With statesanctioned financing arrangements of expensive environmental
projects in the public interest3 l (and therefore collaterally with
29. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 803-09.
30. Id. at 809-11 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Judge Nygaard found that

"[r]egardless of the designation process employed, in each case a designation was
made in the context of a flow control scheme; in each case, that flow control
designation constituted an impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce and by effect alone triggered heightened scrutiny." Id. at 809 (Nygaard, J.,
dissenting).
31. See ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE EPA 170-71 (1993). O'Leary stresses the need for consistent policy which considers welfare of localities, states and nation as whole. Id. Solid waste transport
should be integrated within the overall policy area of solid waste management,
complementing rather than contradicting efforts to reduce solid waste and safely
dispose of waste. Congressional inaction created the opportunity for the courts to
establish inconsistent decisions, and "[c]learly litigation is not the best way to for-
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public health and safety) at stake, it is important to examine the
history and philosophy behind this reversal of fortune in Third Circuit law. Part II of this Article presents the impact of Carbone on
previously settled Third Circuit law.3 2 Part III offers critiques of the
Atlantic Coast decision which reversed Third Circuit law.33 Part IV
cautions against sacrificing public interest in environmental safety
34
on the altar of free trade.
II.

ATLANTIC COAST APPLIES CARAONE TO OVERRULE TRADITIONAL
THIRD CIRCUIT LAW

These environmental difficulties were originally addressed in
the context of the federal environmental legislation of the 1970s
and 1980s, namely the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA) 35 and the Solid Waste Disposal Act amendments to
RCRA in 1980.36 Both showed congressional concern over the fi-

nancing costs for the construction of waste management facilities,
although Congress never provided much federal financial assistance to states and municipalities for this construction.3 7 Indeed,
before Carbone, the legislative history of these acts was generally interpreted to require local flow control, especially because the appropriate method of waste disposal varies with the local volume of
waste generated. 3 8 It was generally assumed from the implications
mulate environmental policy or to determine our nation's environmental priorities." Id. at 170; see also DElL S. WRIGHT, UNDERSTANDING INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS 387 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that solving hazardous waste by litigation is
"almost a certain guarantee that the political process has failed").
32. For a further discussion on the effect of the Supreme Court decision in
Carboneon Third Circuit jurisprudence, see infra notes 35-136 and accompanying
text.
33. For a further discussion of the Carbone-effected decision of Atlantic Coast,
see infra text accompanying notes 137-84.
34. For an analysis of the potential costs to the public and our environment if
decisions like Atlantic Coast receive blind precedential effect, see infra notes 185200 and accompanying text.
35. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016921(k) (1988) [hereinafter RCRA]. RCRA left waste management to local authorities and involved recycling.
36. The Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482,
§§ 18(a), 18(b), 32(d)(1)-(2), 83 Stat. 2334 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6921(k)
(1988)). One particular amended provision seeks to guarantee a steady supply of
waste for local facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a) (5).
37. See Ann R. Mesnikoff, Note, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause Barrier: Keeping Waste at Home, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1224-25 nn.19-27 (1992) (discussing background of RCRA). See generally Warren T. Gregory, et al., Economics
andFinancingof Resource Recovery Projects, in THE SOLID WASTE HANDBOOK, A PRAcrGAL GUIDE 121 (W. Robinson ed. 1986) (presenting project economics and financing formats that could be used for hypothetical resource recovery program).
38. See Diederich, supra note 17, at 191 (noting that Environmental Protec-
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of these statutes that Congress had left it to the states to develop
their own waste management policies by drawing up waste manage39
ment plans to suit the locale in question.
A.

Environmental Legislation Encourages the Building of
Waste Facilities

By leaving the management of their own waste to the states, the
congressional statutory scheme encouraged the states to face up to
their waste problems. Congress, nonetheless, refused to play a continuing role in protecting the states from constitutional challenges
to their local waste ordinances when the courts started to apply
"heightened scrutiny" rather than the less stringent balancing test
formerly invoked. 4° Recent congressional inaction has placed the
states at the mercy of courts that have played no role in establishing
41
the statutory scheme to which the states have been responding.
Partially in response to RCRA, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and
Delaware enacted flow control and solid waste management statutes. 4 2 In order to finance the quality of waste facilities and ensure
tion Act "waste regulations emphasized that state planning must reflect a project's
financial feasibility" and "that in enacting RCRA, Congress envisioned the necessity
that local waste be brought (flowed) to municipal facilities").
39. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 364 (noting that EPA regulations recognize that amount of waste accumulated in particular area " 'will influence the technology choices for recovery and disposal, determine economies of
scale, and affect marketability of resources recovered' ") (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 255.10(c) (1993)).
40. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 379 (noting that courts such
as J. Filiberto, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 857
F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988), overruled by Atlantic Coast Demolition and Recycling, Inc.
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995),
upheld these flow control laws at first, but in early 1990s courts applied "heightened scrutiny" analysis which authors labeled "the strict scrutiny analysis" referring
to DeVito Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F.
Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 974 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991)). The Third Circuit had
originally used the term "heightened scrutiny" in Norfolk Southern Corp. v.
Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 398 (3d Cir. 1987).
41. See Paul S. Weiland & David Imber, Note, Congress, the Courts and the Interstate Transport of Solid Waste, 4 DICK. J. ENVr'L L. & POL'v 79, 80 (1994). The authors state that courts "are given the difficult job of interpreting the Constitution
...[thus] present[ing] a situation in which the courts are actually formulating
policy." Id. The courts apply the Constitution and congressional mandates unaware of the concerns of the states at a local level. Id. at 80, 86-87.
42. New Jersey first enacted waste control legislation in 1970. Solid Waste
Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-1 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); Waste Utility Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:13A-4 (West Supp. 1995). The Solid Waste
Management Act established a statutory framework to coordinate waste-related
processes in the state. § 13:1E-2(b)(1). The Solid Waste Utility Control Act is
designed to regulate the rates at which these services are provided. § 48:13A-2; see
also A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 449 A.2d 516, 518
(N.J. 1982) (recognizing that disposition of solid waste in New Jersey had reached
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that the facility thus built could handle future waste as well as complicated recycling needs, the states were compelled to assure the
contractor/processor that it would have a steady flow of business
into the facility. For example, the New Jersey statutes provide for
coordination of collection, disposal and use of solid waste with regulatory oversight to ensure safe, adequate and proper waste management. 43 Local NewJersey communities in response had to build
waste facilities. The central purposes of the New Jersey statutes include " '60% recycling and disposal self-sufficiency for the nonrecyclable

waste

stream.'"44

Accordingly,

local

New

Jersey

communities had to assure the designated processor of a flow of
waste to make the building of the facility worthwhile.
Flow control implicates not only environmental considerations
but also requires delicate and complicated financial arrangements.
Environmentally, flow control is aimed at providing safe waste disposal over a long period of time and is adaptable to encouraging
the community in waste reduction and recycling. 45 The provision
for management and disposal of waste in the home county prevents
accidents during long distance transportation and leaves the pollution near its point of origin. The major concerns of local government in waste flow control generally include potential liabilities,
public health and safety, and meeting waste goals set by the state. 46
Flow control promotes environmental goals such as less waste production, more streamlined packaging and greater use of recycling.
Financially, flow control is a difficult project to attract longcrisis proportions and that legislature was responsible for state-wide regulation
under Solid Waste Management Act and Solid Waste Utility Control Act of 1970).
Similarly, Pennsylvania enacted the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling &
Waste Reduction Act, Act of July 28, 1988, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.1014000.1904 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). Likewise, Delaware enacted the Solid Waste
Authority Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6406(31) (1991).
43. Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 705 (referring to Solid Waste Management Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-1 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) and Waste Utility Control Act,

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 48:13A-4 (West Supp. 1995)).

44. Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 707 (citations omitted).
45. See Diederich, supra note 17, at 225 & n.294 (listing additional environmental goals promoted by flow control, including inspection and monitoring of
waste, technological innovation, consolidation of trucking and energy recovery
through use of waste for generation of power).
46. Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 407. The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9800 (1988 & Supp. 1994), was enacted to" 'provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into
the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.' " Id.

at 367. One means of promoting cleanup under CERCLA is through the creation
of Superfund which empowers the federal government to respond to hazardous

waste disposal. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-05, 9611-12.
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term investors, because the facilities are expensive and the return
of capital to the investors depends on the volume of waste coming
to the facility. A commentator with a major practice in the financing of waste facilities, Eric Petersen, sets forth the various types of
financial arrangements local governments have been able to negotiate. 47 For example, in a private project financing, the company re-

quires a governmental pledge to supply waste to the facility and pay
for its process or disposal to secure its contract. 48 In a corporate
credit financing, the private company finances the facility with its
own credit as security.49 In a system financing, the governmental
unit issues long-term debt to finance the facilities, which are secured by the revenues of the solid waste system.50 Once these comprehensive statutory schemes were in place, businesses that were
not able to funnel waste into the local facilities either challenged
the constitutionality of the arrangements or, like C & A Carbone,
had to funnel waste into a more expensive facility.
B.

Applicable Dormant Commerce Clause Principles

The dormant aspects of the Commerce Clause that limit state
authority apply when Congress has not acted affirmatively to either
authorize or forbid the challenged state activity. Traditionally, the
Supreme Court has tried to uphold state legislation that did not
interfere with interstate commerce by protecting local businesses
from out-of-state competition. Formerly, the Court used, among
other tests, a test analogous to the rational basis test which permitted the federal government to carry out its function unless the regulation in question had no rational basis.5 1 That balancing test,
47. Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 371-73 & n.57. Congress obvi-

ously considered these financial matters in hearings at the time it passed RCRA,
because it planned no federal appropriations to aid the states in coping with their
environmental problems.
48. Id. at 370 n.49. For example, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994), Clarkstown used a "put or pay" contract to induce a
provider to undertake the commitment. Id. at 1701 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a
further discussion of "put or pay" contracts, see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
49. Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 370 n.50. Merchant facilities
secure the debt by "sign[ing] contracts with several different entities, essentially
selling capacity in the facility to these entities." Id.
50. Id. at 370 n.52.
51. The other, older tests did not necessarily favor the state or public interest,
as the rational basis test does. Even the balancing test sets national interests and
local interests against each other. The balancing test is analogous to the rational
basis test insofar as the Court has, at various times, used both tests to uphold nonviolative-of-the-dormant-Commerce- Clause state regulations. See Evergreen Waste
Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 130 (D. Or. 1986) ("The
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characteristically illustrated in Pike v. Bruce Church, placed the market in a context encompassing environmental and health benefits
and other societal values such as public safety. 52 Historically, the
framework established by the Pike Court had been the major test for
dormant Commerce Clause analysis in the Third Circuit. As one
case stated, Commerce Clause case law "yields two lines of analysis:
first, whether the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce [as in City ofPhiladelphiav. New Jersey5S]; and second, whether
the ordinance imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is
'clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits' [as in Pike v.
Bruce Church]."54

In Pike, the Court held that a facially neutral regulation enacted for a legitimate local purpose unduly burdens interstate commerce only if, after examination, that burden is deemed clearly
excessive in relation to the "putative local benefits." 55 Thus, under
Pike, the Court upheld non-discriminatory local legislation. 56 Significantly, Pike could be interpreted as requiring a balancing test
(Pike balancing test) when any undue burdens on interstate com57
merce resulted from a state regulation.
More recently, in Maine v. Taylor,58 the Court developed a new
59
test that requires greater scrutiny of the state practice in question.
ordinance satisfies Bruce Church, which requires that the ordinance: (1) regulate
evenhandedly; (2) be based on a legitimate local public purpose; (3) have only an
incidental effect on interstate commerce; and (4) not burden commerce excessively in relation to putative local benefits.").
52. 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970); see Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose:
Addressing State Discrimination in Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REv. 381, 420-23
(1995) (describing different theories as to how Court should balance state regulations that have a "discriminatory effect" on interstate commerce against federal
interest) (citing Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv.
1 (1940)).
53. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
54. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994)
(quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
55. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
56. Id.
57. Id. For a description of the balancing test in Pike, see supra note 24.
58. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
59. Id. at 140. According to Maine v. Taylor, a state statute that affirmatively
discriminates against interstate commerce will be upheld only if two conditions are
satisfied: "the statute must serve a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose must
be one that cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means." Id.
Applying this standard, the Maine Court upheld a ban on the importation of live
baitfish, despite the obvious benefit to local baitfish dealers, because of the threat
of contamination of the natural waters of Maine which do not harbor parasites
common to other waters. Id. at 146-47. In Maine, resident Robert Taylor tried to
import live baitfish from outside the state for commercial sale, which was in viola-
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The test becomes not whether the local area has tried to prevent
access to the local market or to keep prices high for local businesses
to enjoy but whether the market operates to maximize business
profit, whatever other values might hang in the balance. 60 The test
for dormant Commerce Clause analysis with respect to waste regulation after Carbone views discrimination against the market as the
sole criterion of the legitimacy of the regulation.
With this as background, we turn to the Third Circuit's waste
cases. Traditionally, an analysis of the relevant Third Circuit dormant Commerce Clause cases concerning landfill management
started with the Third Circuit approach underJ Filiberto Sanitation,
Inc. v. New Jersey Department of EnvironmentalProtection.6 1 In Filiberto,
the New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) 62 directed
the flow of in-state waste to a state transfer station. 63 A Hunterdon
County regulation in the form of an ordinance required all countygenerated trash to be shipped to the county transfer station which
tion of a Maine regulation prohibiting such importation. Id. at 132. Subsequently,
a federal grand jury indicted Taylor for violating a federal statute which criminalizes the transportation of fish in interstate commerce in violation of state law. Id.
at 132-33. Taylor sued under the dormant Commerce Clause, claiming that the
state statute "unconstitutionally burden[ed] interstate commerce." Id. at 133. Possible spread of disease by wild fish was given as the reason for the regulation, and
Maine demonstrated the unavailability of less discriminatory alternatives. Id. at
140-41. The Supreme Court did not know what the environmental dangers actually were but would not invalidate the regulation. Id. at 148. Because adequate
means of testing baitfish for parasites did not exist, the Court determined that the
ban was the least restrictive alternative. Id. at 151.
Most importantly, in effect, the Third Circuit by using Maine's term "heightened scrutiny" to characterize the Supreme Court's recent dormant Commerce
clause review of challenges to state regulations recognizes that the Court has established tiers of scrutiny in this area through its notion of per se discrimination.
Less notably, the balancing test used in Pike may be contrasted with the per se
discrimination test of Maine v. Taylor. To reiterate, the per se discrimination test
introduces a new tier of greater scrutiny into dormant Commerce Clause cases
when the Court believes that other values play a greater role in the state's behavior
than market considerations do.
60. Id. at 151. In conclusion, the majority stated:
The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce. As
long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to
"place itself in a position of economic isolation," it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.
Id. (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
61. 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988), overruled ly Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701 (3d
Cir. 1995).
62. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-1 to 1E-198 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).
63. Filiberto, 857 F.2d at 915.
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opened in 1985.64 The costs of the transfer station were to be financed by tipping fees collected at the facility and set by the
county.6 5 The Third Circuit noted that SWMA efficiently organized
the collection and disposition of solid waste in the state and discouraged illegal dumping. 66 According to the court, the only economic injury present was the additional cost of disposal within the
state.6 7 Accordingly, the court did not complete the Pike balancing
test because the regulation had no cognizable impact on interstate
68
commerce.
The Third Circuit in Filibertochose the Pike balancing test over
the newly available "heightened scrutiny" test of Maine v. Taylor because of the implied congressional approval of the state schemes
devised in response to RCRA, which suggested that there was no
locally-motivated plan to prefer local businesses to out- of-town businesses, thereby discriminating against interstate commerce. 69 The
Filibertocourt determined that these state measures were designed
to ameliorate the rapid deterioration of conditions for the disposal
of waste. 70 Flow control was "genuinely aimed at the legitimate goal
of alleviating a trash crisis." 7 1 Further, the court did not deem the
use of flow control to send local waste to the designated local facility a protectionist measure; rather, the court recognized that flow
control served important and legitimate local interests. 72 Moreover, the court maintained that the hauler's higher tipping cost "relates to the wisdom of the statute, not to its burden on
commerce."7 3 As the only disposal facility in the county, the trans64. Id.
65. Id. at 916. For a definition of tipping fees, see supra note 23.
66. Id. at 920 (quoting testimony of New Jersey Department's principal
planner).
67. Id. at 921. "The only significant economic burden emphasized in the
complaint and the briefing is a burden on in-state collectors, like the plaintiffs,
who will be required to pay higher disposal fees for the disposal services which [the
legislature] has found to be essential to the health and well being of (state] residents." Id. (quoting Harvey & Harvey v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp.
1369, 1380 (D. Del. 1985)).
68. Id. at 922-23. "[T]he only burdens which implicate the Commerce Clause
balancing analysis are those that discriminate against interstate commerce....
Once it is clear no such discrimination has been alleged, 'the inquiry as to the

burden on interstate commerce should end.'" Id. at 922.
69. Id. at 919. "If... the Rule is genuinely aimed at the legitimate goal of
alleviating a trash crisis, and seeks to achieve that goal by means that do not transfer the burden of the solution onto out-of-state interests, it is subject to the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)." Id.
70. Id. at 922.
71. Id. at 919.
72. Id. at 920.
73. Id. at 921.
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fer station was considered irreplaceable. 74 Therefore, the court
concluded that the county needed to make long-term disposal arrangements and the transfer station could not adequately perform
75
without the flow control regulations.
As previously stated, the Filiberto court's decision and analysis
reflected the traditional position espoused by the Third Circuit.
The flow control rules allowed the county to capture a waste stream
thus guaranteeing the facility's financial viability. 76 Notably, the

court recognized the creation of the station as a legitimate public
purpose designed to permit the county to engage in long-term
planning to provide for disposal of the waste. 77 This traditional
approach was dramatically changed by the Supreme Court's decision in Carbone, which ultimately led to the Third Circuit's overruling of Filiberto by its decision in Atlantic Coast.
C.

Carbone Demanded an About-Face of Third Circuit Law

The Supreme Court's new concern with discrimination against
interstate commerce by local protectionism emphasizes the role of
the market by encouraging market entry, and consequently, de-emphasizes public interest, governmental functions and health and
safety regulations. 78 The rebirth of interest in the free market as
the sole value in waste cases occurred in City of Philadelphiav. New
Jersey.79 There, the Supreme Court reversed a New Jersey Supreme
Court decision that had held that the New Jersey waste statute in
question was not only constitutional but also protected the environment resulting in only a slight burden on interstate commerce.80
The Supreme Court, however, viewed protection of local landfills as
discriminating against competition because of the different treatment of in-state and out-of-state waste. 8 1
Once this "discrimination-based model" is used, the inquiry becomes narrowly focused on market entry by out-of-state corporations into local areas. In its "discrimination-based model," the
74. Id. at 922.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 920-21.
77. Id.
78. See generally Ray A. Brown, Police Power-Legislationfor Health and Personal
Safety, 42 HARv. L. REv. 866 (1929) (discussing state's duty to protect its citizens
and judiciary's duty to balance interests in advancing certain legislation).

79. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
80. Id. at 629.
81. Id. at 627. "[A] state may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right
of access over consumers in other states to natural resources located within its
borders." Id.
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Supreme Court centered its examination on the interstate flow of
goods or services and concluded that the Court may strike a regulation down if any harm to private out-of-state business profit occurs
due to protection of local business.8 2 This determination is made
apart from whatever good the regulation does in areas other than
market entry and apart from the reason for using the discriminatory regulation in the first place.8 3 Under this heightened scrutiny,
the state must justify the discrimination beyond the merely legitimate environmental objective, whereas formerly, under Pike the

state only had to prove a legitimate interest, typical of any rational
84
basis review.
This "discrimination-based model" provided the rationale for
the majority in C &A Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown;8 5 there the
initial processing of the waste in Clarkstown was done by one
processing center.8 6 To finance the construction and operation of
the transfer station, the town entered into a five-year contract with a
private contractor.8 7 In order to induce the company to build, the
town: 1) guaranteed a minimum garbage flow at a specified disposal charge over the five years, 2) agreed to a "put or pay" provision,
and 3) passed a flow control ordinance, Local Law 9. as Under a
"put or pay" provision, the local government guarantees the designated facility a certain amount of business; thus, if the business fails
to materialize, the government makes up the difference by paying
82. Id. at 624. "[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected ....
The crucial
inquiry, therefore must be directed to determine whether [the statute in question]
is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can legitimately be viewed as a
law directed to legitimate local concern . . ." Id.
83. But see Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (holding
that statute discriminated against interstate firms, however, dormant Commerce
Clause does not protect market operations or structures). See Donald H. Regan,
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,84
MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1117 (1986) (discussing need for reformulation of efficiency
objection using Exxon and focusing on cost-based justification); Michael E. Smith,
State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. R~v. 1203, 1214-15
(1986) (questioning enduring Supreme Court doctrine of distinguishing between
state regulations discriminating against out-of-state goods and those against out-ofstate retailers of those goods).
84. Twyman, supra note 52, at 398. "The state mustjustify such discrimination
'in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.' "
Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
353 (1977)).
85. 114 S.Ct. 1677 (1994).
86. Id. at 1680.
87. Id.

88. Id. For various types of financing arrangements, see Petersen &
Abramowitz, supra note 17.
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fees to the facility as though the waste had been delivered to the
designated facility. 89 There was no prohibition on interstate movement of trash from Local Law 9, which favored a single processor,
although going through the designated facility first required paying
a tipping fee higher than Carbone's charges. 90 Therefore, the
Supreme Court could have employed a lower standard of review,
because the ordinance could be construed as facially neutral. Local
Law 9 did not raise the cost of servicing the waste once the waste
entered the national market because local residents paid for all
trash they generated. 9 1
The majority nevertheless found that Local Law 9 was discriminatory and therefore, simply endorsed a different type of regulation
for the states to use; namely a regulation establishing uniform standards for every waste business that chose to provide waste service
rather than having the town select one expert firm that could comply with Clarkstown's standard. 9 2 C & A Carbone, the light waste
processor suing the town of Clarkstown for prohibiting its entry
into the less expensive recycling market, argued that the purpose of
the local law was to save the town from the prospect of paying its
"put or pay" guarantee. 93 Any benefits of flow control could be
achieved by the non-discriminatory means of competing in the marketplace, entering into long-term contracts with suppliers of waste
and increasing local taxes or utility fees. 94 The politically unpopular features of these alternatives do not detract from their constitutional acceptability.9 5 Thus, Carbone truly becomes a question of
economic opportunity for such contractors like C & A Carbone who
recognized that voters did not approve of the costs that the taxpayers would have to assume in order to permit C & A Carbone to
enjoy a private business profit. Here, the dormant Commerce
Clause, in effect, operates as the ultimate charter of free trade by
favoring business over the environment, the taxpayers, local govern89. Id. at 1693 (Souter, J., dissenting). "Put or pay" refers to the process
whereby a town makes an estimate of prospective trash generation by residents in
determining the size of a waste facility, and then must deliver that amount to the
facility owner, or pay substantial compensation for failure to do so. Id. (Souter,J.,
dissenting); see also Petersen, supra note 16, at 370 (stating that "put or pay" contracts "obligate the government to deliver or cause to be delivered to the facility at
issue a specified tonnage of waste each year of the contract").
90. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1681, 1693, 1699-1700.
91. Id. at 1693 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1683.
93. Id. at 1684. "Clarkstown admit[s] the flow control ordinance is a financing measure." Id.
94. Id. at 1683-84.
95. Id. at 1702.
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mental arrangements and the creditors who helped to finance the
waste facilities.
According to the majority opinion in Carbone, interstate commerce is affected because (1) C & A Carbone processes out-of-state
waste, while the flow control ordinance "drives up the cost" of disposal for the out-of-state waste, and (2) if out-of-state businesses
wanted to dispose of waste in Clarkstown, they would have to use
the designated local operator who charged more than C & A Carbone. 96 Having a designated operator 'Just ma[de] the protectionist effect of the ordinance more acute" because no one else could
build a waste disposal facility in Clarkstown. 97 The Court, injustice
Kennedy's graphic opinion, pictured Clarkstown as hoarding solid
waste and squelching competition. 98 The majority specifically discounted the argument of necessity or crisis due to the scarcity of
landfill space as hundreds of sites become filled to capacity and pol99
lution costs escalate.
Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, found that an excessive burden test was better than holding the ordinance discriminatory, because C & A Carbone was an in-town processor and was treated in
the same way as every other processor except the designated facility.t°° Because the town's purpose was to generate revenue, the
concurrence asserted that the town could raise revenue by less burdensome means than choosing a designated facility which would
exclude all other waste processors. 10 1 Justice O'Connor balanced
local benefits against the burden that the regulation imposed on
interstate commerce. 10 2 Indeed, Justice O'Connor rejected bond
counsel's argument that RCRA provided explicit authorization for
the town's flow control ordinance on the grounds that health and
safety flow control is much more burdensome than uniform safety
96. Id. at 1681; cf. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (making
same argument, albeit more successfully, about not yet entering into the stream of
commerce).
97. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1683.
98. See id. (stating that "the offending local laws hoard a local resource ... for
the benefit of local businesses that treat it [and] squelch[ ] competition in the
waste-processing service altogether").
99. Id. "The teaching of our cases is that these arguments must be rejected
absent the clearest showing that the unobstructed flow [of] interstate commerce
itself is unable to solve the local problem." Id.
100. Id. at 1687-88 (O'Connor, J.,concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that
Local Law 9 " 'discriminates' evenhandedly against all potential participants in the
waste processing business, while benefitting only the chosen operator of the transfer facility." Id. at 1689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 1689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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regulations.10 3 In doing so, Justice O'Connor made an important
contribution by stating that the flow control ordinance at issue was
not facially discriminatory (or discriminatory in its effects) against
interstate commerce because C & A Carbone and other in-town
waste processors were treated no differently from out-of-town
processors.1 0 4 Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded that because
nearly half the states had flow control ordinances, "the free movement of solid waste in the stream of commerce" would trigger a
"balkanization [that] the Clause is primarily intended to
10 5
prevent."
Justice Souter, in dissent, also recognized that the flow control
ordinance had economic consequences. 10 6 Noting that C & A Carbone's facility lost profits in Clarkstown due to the higher fees it
had to pay there, Justice Souter stated that this loss resulting from
the ordinance was not a burden that violated the Constitution's
Commerce Clause.' 0 7 In contrast, the majority opinion did not address the reason for the disparity in cost between the designated
proprietor and the local waste business dealing in recyclables or
other easily treated waste. The dissenting opinion pointed out that
the designated proprietor was "essentially an agent of the municipal
government, which (unlike Carbone or other private trash processors) must ensure the removal of waste according to acceptable
standards of public health." 0 8 Indeed, private businesses would
not have built the waste facility although "the locality needs [it] in
order to abate (or guarantee against creating) a public
nuisance." 109
103. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The Court generally defers to health
and safety regulations because 'their burden usually falls on local economic interests as well as other States' economic interests, thus insuring that a States's own
political processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations.' "
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978)).
104. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Pike balancing test would therefore
be used butJustice O'Connor suggests that Clarkstown could not win even with the
less stringent balancing test. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Souter asserted that C & A Carbone could comply with both New York and NewJersey's flow
control ordinances. Id. at 1700-01 n.16 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, Justice
O'Connor estimated that eventually some of the many flow control ordinances
were bound to lead to some inconsistency. Id. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 1700-01 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). "Business lost in Clarkstown as a result of a
Clarkstown ordinance is not a burden that offends the Constitution." Id. at 1701
(Souter, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1695 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Aftermath of Carbone in the Third Circuit

Carbonerendered the result in Filibertounacceptable and forced
the Third Circuit to change its doctrinal analysis. In Atlantic Coast,
Judge Stapleton, writing for the court, overruled Filibertoin light of
the Supreme Court decision in Carbone.110 What may be unaffected
by the Carbonedecision is the viability of Swin Resource System, Inc. v.
which employed the very limited market parLycoming County,'
ticipant exemption from the operation of the dormant Commerce
Clause.' 12 The market participant exemption has generally applied
when the state, through contract conditions, favors the local economy for governmental purposes. The market participant exemption permits a county-operated landfill to charge a higher fee for
waste generated outside a local area than for locally-generated
waste without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey had left 'open the question of whether state110. See Atlantic Coast Demolition and Recycling v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701, 713 n.17 (3d Cir. 1995). Nevertheless,
prior to the Carbone decision, several commentators distinguished City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey from the type of waste flow control situation addressed in Atlantic
Coast insofar as the waste in Atlantic Coast did not enter into interstate commerce,
an argument later successfully presented to the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). As one environmental litigator contrasted the situations in City of Philadelphia (which dealt with out-of-state waste prohibited from
entering New Jersey) and Atlantic Coast (which dealt with prohibitions against exporting New Jersey waste to another state):
Export barriers pertaining to locally generated waste are completely different from import restrictions pertaining to waste which is in the stream
of commerce. Export barriers do not impose one jurisdiction's will upon
another .... Export barriers eliminate waste before the need arises to

place it into commerce or the need for outside disposal service.
Diederich, supra note 17, at 221.
111. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
112. Id. at 249. The dissent said the market participant exemption is "a peculiar eruption of Dixieism." Id. at 257 (Gibbons, CJ., dissenting). See generally Dan
T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-ParticipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1989) (deciphering foundation of market participant
exemption); Diederich, supra note 17, at 226-31 (discussing difficulties inherent in
market participant exemption); Paul S. Kline, Publicly-Owned Landfills and Local
Preferences: A Study of the Market ParticipantDoctrine, 96 DicK. L. REv. 331 (1992)
(reviewing Swin decision and history of market participant exemption); David
Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309
(1989) (arguing for broadened market participant exemption allowing states to
retain natural resources). For different approaches to whether, according to the
market participant exemption, landfills should be classified as services or natural
resources, see Bradford Mank, Out-of-State Trash: Solid Waste and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 25, 42 (1990); William L. Kovacs
& Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participantsin Solid Waste Disposal ServicesFairCompetition of the Destructionof the PrivateSector, 18 ENvrL. L. 779, 815-16 (1988).
For further discussion of the market participant exemption, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
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owned waste facilities may prevent out-of-state waste from being imported when the state is a participant in the market rather than a
market regulator."13 In Swin, Lycoming County operated a landfill
that charged higher disposal fees for waste generated beyond its
five and one-half county service area in an attempt to preserve its
landfill capacity for local residents."14 The Third Circuit held that
the county acted as a market participant, not a market regulator,
and therefore, the county's actions were not susceptible to scrutiny
under the dormant Commerce Clause. 1 15 Accordingly, the court
upheld the fee schedule favoring local waste.'1 6 Further, the court
rejected the contention that the market participant exemption did
not apply to a landfill on the grounds that it was a natural
resource. "1

7

This market participant exemption enables "the people to determine as conditions demand.., what services and functions the
public welfare requires." l" 8 While Swin indicates that the market
participant exemption remains viable, 119 the facts of that case make
the exemption applicable to a narrow set of circumstances. Furthermore, if we use other categories, this exemption is not necessary. For example, an argument Carbone rejects, that local waste in
the county has not entered the flow of commerce and therefore is
not subject to the dormant Commerce Clause, would obviate the
need for the exemption. 120 Under current law, however, a county
113. See Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345

(1994). Oregon Waste Systems illustrates that the market participant exemption
rarely applies. The Court held that a state statute directing private landfills to add
a mandated surcharge on waste generated out of state was impermissibly discriminatory. Id. at 1350. The Court declined to address the issue whether Oregon
could accomplish its cost spreading through market participation. Id. at 1354 n.9.
Significantly, Swin did address the issue in New Jersey. Swin, 883 F.2d at 248-54.
114. Swin, 883 F.2d at 246.
115. Id. at 251.
116. Id. at 254-55.
117. Id. at 251-54; see Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (determining
that groundwater is article of interstate commerce that state cannot prohibit sale
of to other states); Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water: State
Options after Sporhase, 70 NEB. L. REv. 754, 809-10 (1991) (discussing natural re-

source exception and constitutional options available to states attempting to regulate transfers of groundwater out-of-state).
118. Swin, 883 F.2d at 251 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.11
(1976)).
119. Id. at 249. See generally Charles Gray, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74
CAL. L. REv. 1329, 1344-47 (1986) (providing analysis of market participant doctrine); Michael R.Harpring, Comment, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage: Municipal Solid
Waste and the Need for CongressionalAction, 40

CATH.

U. L. REv. 851, 872-74 (1991)

(same).
120. C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 (1994).
The argument that interstate commerce is not implicated by a county's local waste
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or municipality must maintain outright ownership of the waste facility in order to favor local trash without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. Furthermore, flow control ordinances, as regulatory
measures, do not fall into the class of local action generally found
in the market participant cases. When the state or local government is not a contracting party, Commerce Clause scrutiny will be
12 1
applied.
One surprising aspect in Atlantic Coast was the employment of
the "heightened scrutiny" standard when New Jersey used the public utility concept for waste facilities because of the prior history of
organized crime's involvement in the waste industry. 122 Given the
difficulty of the problem and the concerted effort by the State of
New Jersey to combat the influence of crime on the industry, it
might have been assumed that the Court, utilizing a balancing test
method, would recognize the weight of the public interest in the
municipal establishment of designated waste facilities. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court applied the "heightened scrutiny" test
to a protectionist state public utility regulation in Wyoming v.
Oklahoma.123 Likewise, in Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission,1 2 4 the Supreme Court stated that public utility regulation is not a special category for Commerce Clause
purposes.1 2 5 The Supreme Court, however, used the Pike balancing
may prove more viable after a recent Supreme Court decision. See United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding possession of guns in school zone is not in
interstate commerce for purpose of invoking Congress' authority under Commerce Clause).
121. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82
(1984). In South-Central Timber, the Supreme Court asserted that a state cannot
impose restrictions even if privity of contract exists. Id. at 97. "IT]he doctrine is
not carte blanche to impose any conditions that the State has the economic power
to dictate, and does not validate any requirement merely because the State imposes it upon someone with whom it is in contractual privity." Id. The Court required that the state be a major participant in the market and that the market be
narrowly defined. Id. at 97-98. Therefore, the Court concluded that although
Alaska was a participant in the timber market, the state could not dictate the terms
of processing because it was not a participant in the secondary market. Id. at 9899.
122. Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing crisis during 1970s in private unregulated waste disposal market and listing cases which
documented illegalities).
123. 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
124. 461 U.S. 375 (1983).
125. Id. at 395; see also Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 713 ("[W]e do not read the
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to suggest that state utility regulation is
to be judged by different standards than other state regulation. When state utility
regulation is protectionist, the Supreme Court has employed heightened scrutiny;
where it is not, a benefits and burdens analysis has been applied.").
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test on the state and local government to review the state's regulations of others in the market. 12 6 Accordingly, following the
Supreme Court's rationale, the Third Circuit in Atlantic Coast
treated New Jersey as a market regulator. The Third Circuit applied Carbone,deeming the NewJersey flow control ordinance a discriminatory measure. 12 7 The Third Circuit also used the
"heightened scrutiny" test, even though New Jersey, as the most
densely populated state, suffers an overall shortfall of disposal
capacity.
After applying the Carbone analysis, the Third Circuit remanded Atlantic Coast.'2 8 On remand, the district court concluded
that in reliance on a steady rate of revenue, Atlantic County undertook financial responsibilities for its waste facilities.1 29 Accordingly, it incurred one billion dollars in debt which was guaranteed
30
by several counties, the Port Authority and financial institutions.1
In addition, default on the bonds was possible in these circumstances. 131 Thus, the court determined that the disruption resulting from the suit would discourage (1) "the creation of new waste
disposal facilities," and (2) "the maintenance and expansion of existing facilities" unless Atlantic County implemented a new comprehensive regulatory scheme.13 2 The local governments admitted
13 3
that they had no clear feasible alternatives to the current scheme.
The district court stated that the lack of alternatives alone did not
meet the onerous burden of showing that even the relatively simple
alternatives of Carbone (general taxes or municipal bonds) were not
feasible alternatives to the current discriminatory regime.1 3 4 On
June 9, 1995, the court therefore asked the state to submit an alternative plan within sixty days, so it could grant Atlantic Coast's mo126. Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp., 461 U.S. at 392-93. The Court used the
Pike test, balancing local interests against interstate commerce interest & declined
to use heightened scrutiny because "economic protectionism is not implicated
here." Id. at 393.
127. Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 710-13.
128. Id. at 717-18. The remanded case is Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 893 F. Supp. 301
(D.N.J. 1995). Judge Irenas' opinion came down on November 28, 1995. It is
presently before Judge Irenas, and the latest action, a conditional grant of plaintiff's motion for pendente lite relief, was on June 6th, 1995.
129. 893 F. Supp. at 306.
130. Id.
131. Id. "Wholesale disruption of the waste flow regulations could impair the
ability of the county authorities to finance this debt and could ultimately force
them into default on the bonds or contractual obligations." Id.
132. Id. at 307.
133. Id. at 308.
134. Id.
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5
tion for preliminary injunctive relief.13
This "discrimination" interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause and its attendant "heightened scrutiny" burdens on
the states leave the local and state government environmental protection dependent on facts that only the government can prove.
The interpretation, however, does not deal entirely with the dangers to the environment itself or to public health. This is because it
is unclear how long it may take before the difficulties in financing
and the disruption to the environment will become obvious and
reach a crisis level. Even when applying strict scrutiny, courts seem
to disregard Justice Blackmun's admonition in Maine v. Taylor that
"the commerce clause cannot be read as requiring the [states] to sit
idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage
13 6
has occurred."

III.

THE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRITIQUING CARBONE AS IT APPLIES TO
ATLANTIC COAST

The opinions in Carbone provide a perspective for examining
the problem in Atlantic Coast. The tensions of balancing the needs
of the environment with the demands of free trade appeared on
the surface of Carbone, when Justice Souter in dissent assumed the
old New England mantle of protecting the states' police power for
promulgating health and safety regulations, a mantle once proudly
worn by Justice Horace Gray, who in the nineteenth century dissented from decisions striking down state laws involving the police
powers.13 7 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
in Carbone began with the assertion that "[w] hile the immediate effect of the [flow control] ordinance is to direct local transport of
solid waste to a designated site within the local jurisdiction, its eco138
nomic effects are interstate in reach."
Thus, in Carbone,Justice Kennedy followed City of Philadelphia,
to the effect that New Jersey behaved in a protectionist manner to
isolate itself from a problem by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade. As in City of Philadelphia,the CarboneCourt
refused to apply the balancing test that Pike permitted. 139 The Car135. Id. at 312.
136. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
137. See Samuel Williston, Horace Gray, in 8 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 139,
139-88 (William D. Lewis ed., 1909) (providing appreciation of Justice Gray,
United State Supreme Court (1882-1901)).
138. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 (1994).
139. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 & n.4
(1938) (upholding, under rational basis test, federal statute that prevented out-of-
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bone Court stated: "The teaching of our cases is that these arguments must be rejected absent the clearest showing that the
unobstructed flow of interstate commerce itself is unable to solve
the local problem. The Commerce Clause presumes a national
market free from local legislation that discriminates in favor of local
interests."1 4 The Court suggested that governmental regulation
had the alternative of imposing safety conditions on C & A Carbone
to ensure that private businesses "do not underprice the market by
cutting corners on environmental safety. ' 141 Read this way, the flow
control ordinance is deemed to be protectionist. As the Court
noted: "It ensures that the town-sponsored facility will be profitable,
so that the local contractor can build it and Clarkstown can buy it
back at nominal cost in five years. In other words ...the flow con-

trol ordinance is a financing measure."1 42 According to the Carbone
majority, the long-term provision for stable, safe waste-processing
could have been subsidized by different financial arrangements
such as "general taxes or municipal bonds," thereby forcing governmental ownership of waste facilities onto states, counties and municipalities to avoid the heightened scrutiny of the new dormant
Commerce Clause test.143 Finally, the Court admitted that the flow
control ordinance "may not in explicit terms seek to regulate interstate commerce," but the Court determined that out-of-state competition is harmed "nonetheless by its practical effect and
1

design."

44

This result, however, evoked a strong dissent from Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist andJustice Blackmun. Justice
Souter began with the strong precedential history that the dormant
Commerce Clause's protection of access to local markets has traditionally been limited to striking down laws to improve "the competitive position of local economic actors, just because they are local,
state shipment of filled milk but articulating in footnote four rationale for using
more stringent standard of review than rational basis in special circumstances);
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. Rxv. 713 (1985) (explaining difficulty in adapting Carolene's formula to combat modern prejudice against
"discrete and insular minorities").
140. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1683.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1684.
143. Id. Again, it was left to the dissent to point out that, "in any event it is far
from clear that the alternative to flow control (i.e., subsidies from general tax revenues or municipal bonds) would be less disruptive of interstate commerce than
flow control, since a subsidized competitor can effectively squelch competition by
underbidding it." Id. at 1702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1684.
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vis-A-vis their foreign competitors."1 45 The decision in Carbone extends the ambit of the dormant Commerce Clause to the public
arena, while earlier cases traditionally dealt with favoring local
products or local businesses over out-of-state alternatives. Clarkstown's transfer station was essentially a municipal facility built and
operated under a municipal contract, rendering it a public enterprise. 146 This was the heart of the dissent: the public interest was
being served by the provision of a local waste facility and at the
same time was being paid for by the local waste producers in their
147
fees to use the facility that the municipality had commissioned.
The local government "enter[ed] the market to serve the public
interest of local citizens quite apart from private interest in private
gain."1 48 In showing that the public interest was at work, the dissenting opinion took pains to explain factually why "[a] ny whiff of
economic protectionism [was] far from obvious."'1 4 9 Indeed,
Clarkstown undertook to build the waste facility because the state
insisted upon the closure of the unsound landfill that the town was
50
using.'
In some sense it is the absence of evidence that proves the
point: if Clarkstown had the financial resources to build the transfer station itself, rather than sponsoring it and arranging to have it
built, the market participant exemption would have protected it
from invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause. C & A
Carbone did not mention any outside transfer stations that could
handle the local business, nor did it state that any loss of business
from the ordinance had occurred: "if the record supported an inference
that above-market pricing at the Clarkstown transfer station caused less
trash to flow to out-of-state landfills and incinerators,that, too, might have
constitutional significance."15 1 The financing of the waste facility
through flow control is an aspect of the public interest because of
the great investment required to build a safe waste facility, the lim145. Id. at 1695 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Regan, supra note 83, at
1138).
146. Id. at 1693-98 (SouterJ., dissenting).
147. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissent took this idea further,
stating that the record "shows that the burden falls entirely on Clarkstown residents." Id. at 1700 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1700 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Carbone, the public interest was in
environmental protection, health and safety. Id. at 1683. These interests fall
within the values of federalism, state police powers and such venerable precedents
as Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
150. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1693 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1700 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ited budgets of municipalities and the political considerations that
prevent unpalatable rises in taxes. Finally, the public interest is
served by flow control because C & A Carbone would otherwise be
able to "rely on the municipal facility when that was advantageous
but opt out whenever the transfer station's price rose above the
market price," thus causing the local residents to assume the bur152
den of payment forC & A Carbone's private business profits.
The brevity of the Court's opinion underlines the fact that a
single value is at stake: the operation of the market for entrants
into the waste disposal business in Clarkstown. No complications
such as the quality of the disposal that the ordinance called for disturb this single vision of market entry. Why is the more expensive,
safer disposition of the waste not weighed against disposition in unlined landfills? Why is Carbone's selection of recyclable cardboard
and other low-priced, less-difficult-to-handle waste irrelevant to the
Court's opinion? 153 In effect, what the less sophisticated waste handlers like C & A Carbone do is deal only with easy recycling materials, naturally charging lower fees to those users, but leaving the
taxpayers to make up the difference in other cases under the "put
or pay" arrangement. The presence or absence of an actual loss of
out-of-state business played no part in the Court's opinion because
its interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause was normative:
the Court is committed to the extended view of the market as the
touchstone of the dormant Commerce Clause, rather than to "the
right to compete on terms independent of one's location."1 54 The
major value to be protected under this framing of the issue is additional waste businesses' entry into the market for waste disposal and
cheaper prices for businesses using the cardboard recycling services. 15 5 This type of reasoning "dumbs down" the constitutional
protection from an overall sense of even-handedness to serving as a
handmaiden for private business profit. With such a circumscribed
approach, no other considerations need enter into the decision152. Id. at 1702 (Souter,J., dissenting). C & A Carbone (Carbone) stated that
customers must pay $11 more per ton to use the designated facility at the Clarkstown transfer station because Carbone deals in recyclables that do not need stateof-the-art waste technology. Id. at 1699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
153. But see id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding significant that "90 percent of
Carbone's waste stream comprises recyclable cardboard, while the Clarkstown facility takes all manner of less valuable waste, which it treats with state-of-the-art environmental technology not employed at Carbone's more rudimentary plant").
154. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
155. See, e.g., Briefs of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 113 S. Ct. 2411 (1993) (No. 92-1402) (including
Chemical Manufacturers Association and American Automobile Manufacturers Association, among other businesses).
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making process, and the primacy of interstate entry into the waste
business necessarily overwhelms local public interest. 15 6
The Carbonecase, whatever its environmental merits or demerits, 15 7 adopts a particular economic approach which might fairly be
characterized as compatible with an economic libertarian philosophy. In that regard, Carboneharks back to the attempt earlier in the
century to shape similar results under the Due Process Clause in
Lochner v. New York 158 by adopting a particular economic philosophy. Before the decision in Carbone,Judge Richard Posner, the
leading proponent of using economic insights into legal issues,
wrote about the dangers of exclusively economic approaches to the
Constitution. While Judge Posner was not discussing any particular
case, he warned in general terms against extensive alignment of the
Constitution to the economic libertarian approach on the grounds
that too close a connection with any single approach exacts a costly
exclusion of other possible solutions and interpretations:
Like any form of aggressive constitutionalism, whether
left-wing or right-wing, the economic libertarian approach
(whether it takes the form of reinterpretation of the existing Constitution, amendment, or both) diminishes the
role of democracy - potentially dramatically ....
What is
envisaged therefore is a drastic curtailment, across the
board, in the scope of permissible legislative, executive,
and administrative action.... The scope of democratic
government would not quite be limited to the selection
and oversight of persons administering a small number of
relatively uncontroversial functions ....
But that is the
direction in which the proposal tends.1 5 9
156. See Laura Gabrysch, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause-Flow Control Ordinances That Require Disposal of Trash at a DesignatedFacility Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 563 (1995) (explaining that Supreme Court has
restricted use of dormant Commerce Clause as test for free entry into market).
157. See Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce
Clause, 39 S.D. L. REv. 529, 530 n.15 (1994) (suggesting that flow control does not
provide enough protection for major environmental goals of reducing production
of waste and recycling).
158. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS:
THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK (1990) (detailing Lochner history and setting forth its effects on economic and legal theories); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 (1987) (explaining that Lochner Court required
government neutrality, defining this notion as whether state threatened shift of
common-law distribution of wealth and entitlements); see also Gary C. Leedes, The
Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1361, 1420 (1979) (noting that in balancing
legislative ends, Supreme Court is "unleashed" to substitute its policy judgments
for those of state legislatures).
159. Posner, supra note 5, at 21; see also Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent,
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While the likely dangers of an exclusive approach are more extensive than a single case might impose, it is nevertheless instructive
to examine the effect of Carbone on state environmental legislation
from the point of view of democratic political practice, which the
6 0 Of
Supreme Court, as an unelected body, does not represent.
course, Congress, representing the nationally elected majority, if it
so decides, can undo any ill effects arising from the dormant Commerce Clause decisions of the Supreme Court, although what is
necessary to evoke congressional response in any particular case is
16 1
frequently uncertain.
judge Posner's concerns can be applied to the situation in Atlantic Coast. The New Jersey legislature passed a statute to deal with
a difficult waste disposal situation requiring intricately balanced financing. 162 According to Judge Posner, the Commerce Clause protects against the danger of the federal system "degenerating into a
loose confederation, riddled with externalities," referring, in effect,
to those who can shift part of their private economic costs to the
taxpaying public. 163 Therefore, the New Jersey statute is subject to
being tested by the fire of the dormant Commerce Clause. Using
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE
L.J. 569, 581-90 (arguing that free trade between states should only be a constitutional principle if such words appear in text of Constitution and not if merely
judge-made).
160. See generally Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 400-10 (1986) (exploring possible judicial roles
in state regulation). Farber suggests that the "practical effects of current [Commerce Clause] doctrine may be more profound, however, than individual cases
suggest. Because the outcomes of the cases are so unpredictable, the doctrine may
well have a chilling effect on legitimate state regulation." Id. at 414.
161. Representative Chris Smith, Republican from New Jersey of the House
Energy & Commerce Committee, introduced an amendment to RCRA's Solid
Waste Disposal Act. The bill was referred to the House Commerce Committee.
Representative Smith stated that Mercer County could lose $71 million in bonds.
140 CONG. REc. H5457, 5458 (daily ed. June 30, 1994) (statement of Rep. Smith);
see 141 CONG. Rxc. H291 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Smith) (asserting that restoration of flow control authority to state and local governments is necessary because of significant debt amassed by communities). Senator Frank
Lautenberg, Democrat from NewJersey, stated that NewJersey has an investment
of more than $2 billion in flow control facilities. 140 CONG. REc. S7371, 7372
(daily ed.June 21, 1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). See generally Engel, supra
note 12, at 1546-51 (discussing congressional options for managing distribution of
nation's solid waste).
162. Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701,702 (3d Cir. 1995).
163. Posner, supra note 5, at 28. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47
VAND. L. Ruv. 1355 (1994) (explaining that Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
concerned with maintaining boundaries between state and national authority and
is "natural laboratory" for development of federalist theory).
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the current interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause, the
waste businesses that wish to come from outside the area to which
the waste statute or ordinance applies may take advantage of the
dormant Commerce Clause if they are offering, at least in the beginning, cheaper prices because they do not have to pay the cost of
building the waste facility or cannot provide the range of services
the designated facility offers. 16 4 In the end, however, the costs affected by the challenging business, either to the environment or to
16 5
the taxpayer may prove to be far greater.
One commentator, Sidney Wolf, sees the opposite danger.
Recognizing the seriousness of the "garbage" problem in the
United States, he nevertheless focuses on constitutional jurisdiction
and worries more that "[t]he courts which have sanctioned flow
control have simply ignored or distorted the prior decisions of the
Supreme Court regarding waste flow. This may arguably be good
environmental policy but it is not good constitutional jurisprudence. 1 6 6 But even this assertion is disputed in this very vexed area
of law with its extremely complicated facts, as an analogy to nineteenth-century quarantine and meat inspection cases shows. 16 7 Fur164. See Engel, supra note 11, at 1514-15 & n.144. The startup costs are
higher, but continued reliance on out-of-state disposal is expected to prove even
costlier in the future than actively building new disposal facilities. Id. at 1514-15 &
n.143. Testimony during congressional hearings suggests that cheaper export of
solid waste allows avoidance in waste reduction, recycling and upgrading disposal
facilities. Id. at 1517 n.153 (citing Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Transportationand HazardousMaterials of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 80, 300 (1991) (statement of Allen
Hershkowitz, Natural Resources Defense Council)).
165. See Mesnikoff, supra note 37, at 1241-42 n.107 (stating that counties are
reassessing whether it is financially feasible without flow control to install composting facilities and providing example of county that put its composting plans on
hold, fearing Commerce Clause litigation would deprive facility of flow of waste
necessary for financing). If a new facility eliminated the need to export waste,
private haulers would have incentives to tie up the plant in Commerce Clause litigation. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 390 (stating that two Ohio
facilities have already shut down because of concerns about waste supply in absence of legislative flow control). See generally Charles T. DuMars, State Market Power
and Environmental Protection: A State's Right to Exclude Garbage in Interstate Commerce,
21 N.M. L. REv. 37 (1990) (examining continuing marginalization of environmental and health concerns in name of free trade).
166. Wolf, supra note 157, at 568 (citation omitted). In further support of his
argument, Wolf noted that "Americans produce more garbage, both per person
and in absolute amounts, than any other nation in the world." Id. at 529.
167. At the time, the quarantine cases were not deemed violative of the dormant Commerce Clause. The quarantine laws banned the importation of noxious
articles which endangered the public health. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CWIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 143-66 (1985) (discussing impact of Slaughterhouse Cases). See generally Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895
and The Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HisT. REv.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss3/7

32

McCauliff: The Environment Held in Trust for Future Generations or the Dorma

1995]

ENVIRONMENT FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS

thermore, the intent of the Commerce Clause may not originally
have been to institute free trade, which was simply one of many
aspects of general welfare entrusted to Congress.1 68 If that is the
case, the Court's current judicial activism may disturb not only the
constitutional balance favoring federalism, in the form of state and
local laws, but also the balance favoring democracy, in the form of
statutes and policies made by elected representatives.
Some recent views of federalism set forth the prospect of returning power to the states as the ultimate repositories of democracy. For example, in New York v. United States,169 which deals with a
federal statute enacted pursuant to the congressional commerce
power rather than dormant Commerce Clause, Justice O'Connor
held that a requirement that the states assume responsibility for radioactive waste located in their jurisdictions was unconstitutional
on the grounds of coercion. 170 The Court found that Congress had
numerous methods of getting New York to do what it wished without violating the Constitution. 7 1 Thus, federalism could be pro304 (1979) (discussing forces transforming American corporate law); Charles W.
McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government- Business Relations: Some
Parametersof Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism,1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIsT. 970, 1004-05
(1975) (warning generally against linking earlier laissez-faire philosophy's economic materialism too closely with judiciary).
168. Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. Rrv. 71, 78-79 n.31 (1980). No evidence exists that the Commerce Clause was intended to institute free trade or that
the courts were authorized to supervise state legislation. Id.; see also Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 1484,
1491-93 (1987) (book review) (asserting position that original intent of Constitutional framers and ratifiers was to increase power of states and decrease power of
federal government).
169. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
170. Id. at 149. At issue was a federal statute in search of a state-based solution for the radioactive waste disposal problem. Id. at 169-70. The statute could be
understood either as mandating regulation or as offering a series of incentives to
the state for carrying out federal policy. Id. Justice O'Connor asserted that the
federal government must respect state governments as the seat of autonomous legislative processes and that the court has the duty to police congressional encroachment on the autonomy of the states in obedience to the spirit of the Tenth
Amendment. Id. at 174-77; see HJ. Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw,
79 VA. L. Rv. 633 (1993) (discussing Justice O'Connor's concept of federalism in
New York v. United States); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-70
(1991) (examining applicability of federal age discrimination statute to states'
mandatory retirement ages for judges).
171. New York, 505 U.S. at 166-69. First, the Court noted that Congress'
spending power enabled Congress to "attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds." Id. at 167 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)). In
utilizing this method, however, Congress must establish conditions that bear "some
relationship" to the purpose of the federal funds. Id.
Second, the Court proposed the notion of "cooperative federalism." Id. This
arrangement could be used where Congress has Commerce Clause authority to
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moted without thwarting congressional will. Federalism, however,
does not extend protection to state legislation that the Supreme
Court deems violative of the national market. Accordingly, the role
of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in this new federalism
regulates, and indeed, limits, what the states can do in their democratic attempts to solve local problems.
At present in the waste control situation, rather than have Congress either legislate solutions or mandate that the states devise solutions within certain parameters, the states are free to devise their
own solutions. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court serves as the
guardian of whether the states have paid sufficient attention to free
trade in their regulations and legislation. The traditional statement
of the role of the dormant Commerce Clause as the charter of free
trade has not changed.1 72 What may be bringing about different
results in dormant Commerce Clause cases striking down local ordinances and statutes is the conclusion that the Court draws from the
factual presentations of the cases. For example, protection for entrants with limited environmental technological capabilities was
permitted under the majority opinion in Carbone that struck down
the local waste flow ordinance in Rockland County. As commentators Eskridge and Ferejohn concluded: "what matters is the Court's
perception of external effects."1 73 These authors point out that earlier cases upholding local legislation with insignificant external effects might not be upheld today because of the primacy economic
arguments presently enjoy. 174 In that sense, free trade becomes the
overriding concern that can cause entire schemes, provisions and
building projects to be halted, should the regulation later be
deemed to have violated free trade, whether intentionally or incidentally. That harm to free trade is the time bomb that vitiates the
regulate private activity. Id. In that situation, the Court recognized Congress'
power "to offer states the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation." Id. (citing Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
172. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-26 (1935) (detailing
Commerce Clause analysis with respect to pricing of out-of-state milk). Justice Cardozo, explaining the rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause, stated that the
Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are
in union and not division." Id. at 523. But see Regan, supra note 83, at 1252 (characterizing above passage by Justice Cardozo as "rhetorically inflated" description of
"the evil of protectionism [and n]othing more").
173. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 163, at 1397.
174. Id. at 1397-98 (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), finding constitutional state law that required state licensed pilots in Philadelphia harbor).
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state legislation. 175
The economic aspects of federalism, as expressed in the Commerce Clause and practiced by the Supreme Court in its dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, become relatively more or less
important in scope according to the value given to the principle of
democracy. When the Supreme Court puts a premium on democracy, it emphasizes the right of state-elected legislatures to act
under their police powers. 176 When the Court is more mindful of
laissez-faire, the dormant Commerce Clause cases emphasize the
"charter of free trade." Other commentators have seen the same
danger thatJudge Posner warned us about.1 77 Additionally, Professor Daniel Farber concludes that the constitutional provision in the
Commerce Clause for free trade does not justify expansive judicial
review:
Even in relatively unimportant areas, there is something to
be said for allowing the people of a state to determine
their laws through the democratic process. These values
of federalism and democratic self-rule are impaired when
a federal court imposes its own view of desirable social pol178
icy on the states.
Applying Farber's insight to Carbone, the majority of the present Court is not allowing a balancing test for state legislation when
175. See Regan, supra note 83, at 1093 (explaining that dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence concerning "movement-of-goods" cases has dealt exclusively
with Supreme Court prohibiting states from engaging in "purposeful [economic]
protectionism").
176. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.)
(holding unconstitutional license fee for sale of imports and illustrating Supreme
Court's early recognition of police power); SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE
GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901,
at 151-62 (1964) (discussing role of strong adherents of laissez-faire in restricting
role of police power); C.M.A. McCauliff, ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof History and
NaturalLaw: Complementary or Rival Modes of Discourse?, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 287, 293311 (1988) (discussing Justice Horace Gray's role in supporting state police power
and Justice Stephen Field's circumscription of state police powers during post-civil
war liberalism).
177. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 36-45 (A. Dan
Tarlock ed., 1981) (comparing state and federal roles in American common market); Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce
ClauseJurisprudence,50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 47, 58-64 (1981) (finding that inherent
problems in Supreme Court's balancing test for Commerce Clause cases have led
to inconsistent Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
178. Farber, supra note 160, at 414. Moreover, Farber stated that "[u]nder
current doctrine, courts are asked to decide whether laissez-faire is better national
policy than state regulation. Such policy determinations are better left with more
democratic institutions." Id.
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that legislation may adversely affect out-of-state firms. In his dissenting opinion in Carbone, Justice Souter was careful to recognize
the need to balance the benefits of a flow control ordinance against
the possible economic harm it might cause to people in other
states. 179 Unlike the majority, Justice Souter found no per se discrimination.1 8 0 Notably, decisions invalidating state regulations
under the dormant Commerce Clause advance judicial power vis-avis state power, challenging by implication the strength of both federalism and democratically-elected state legislatures.
At various points in our history, different accommodations
have been made between economic libertarianism (and its earlier
incarnations) and the extreme claims of democracy. 8 1 Both approaches go too far. In the past and more recently, however, moderate parties and administrators, from the Whigs of yesterday to the
economic regulators of today (who see private business, if not in
partnership with government, then at least as two legitimate constituents of the commonwealth), have struck a workable balance between socialism, on the one hand, and leaving the market
unfettered, on the other hand. Such a balance is never permanent
and is always subject to reassessment. 182 "In our modern society, a
tension exists between those values favoring individual freedom
179. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1699 (1994)
(SouterJ., dissenting) (stating that balancing test weighs "nature of the burden on
interstate commerce, the nature of the local interest, and the availability of alternative methods for advancing the local interest without hindering the national one")
(citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
180. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1698-1702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181. See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society,
1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 231 (noting that laissez-faire "commanded easy acceptance" in
19th century, but "had ceased to be acceptable by the depression years, the years of
reckoning for the age of heedlessness"); see also Aaron Director, Prefaceto HENRY C.
SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR

A FREE

SOCIETY, at v, vi (1948):

There may once have been substantial merit in the notion that the freemarket system would steadily gain in strength if only it were freed of widespread state interference. By 1934, it became evident that a combination
of the negative attitude, which permitted the proliferation of monopoly
power, and promiscuous political interference, which strengthened such
power, threatened "disintegration and collapse" of the economic organization. And only the "wisest measures by the state" could restore and
maintain a free-market system.
Id.
182. See Paul S. Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failureas Catalysts for
Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46
WASH.& LEE L. REv. 1, 7 (1989) (stating that "economic regulation often attempts
to replicate the pricing and service levels that would exist in a competitive market,
while ensuring the protection of public interest values which are not a high priority in a laissez-faire environment").
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and those favoring social control."18 3 Extreme positions on both
the right (with its unfettered market) and the overly-controlling left
send warning calls to the electorate about particular current dangers, but only set the general, basic conditions of society during
revolutions. As we swing between these extreme positions today,
the voice of viable moderation is often crying in the wilderness,
184
while it is the voice that most needs to be heard.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

THE THIRD CIRCUIT PRESIDES OVER TRIMMED

ENVIRONMENTAL SAILS IN DEFERENCE TO FREE TRADE

The importance of the dormant Commerce Clause to those
who value free trade as a central constituent of the economic libertarian interpretation of the Constitution cannot be over-estimated.
The arguments they make return us to the times of the original
constitutional debates in the early history of our nation, in that
every assumption and previous choice of value is ripe for discussion
and reassessment. Therefore, the Supreme Court decisions are
only the legal reflection of the fundamental values which we bring
to an interpretation of the Constitution. Burkean historicism
would lean towards consistent use of precedents and slow departure
from long-standing historical trends. But if we step back from the
current situation, it is evident that the pendulum of predominating
interpretation and theory has swung back and forth more than
once in the two-hundred-year history of our Constitution. 85 Use of
the Commerce Clause to strike down state laws is not by itself inconsistent with democratic or popular rule. Indeed, no conflict at all
exists when Congress invalidates state laws on the grounds of interference with interstate laws. 18 6 Economic libertarianism as a "con183. FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALs 2 (3d ed.

1986).
184. See Dempsey, supra note 182, at 40 ("Can we find a prudent middle
ground between excessive regulation and excessive laissez faire? . .. [The] careful
adjustment of the appropriate level of government vis-a-vis the market.., poses
the most challenging opportunity for creative minds during the next decade.").
185. See, e.g., McCauliff, supra note 176, 293-311 (discussing differing views of
state police power); Sunstein, supra note 158, at 874 (describing requirement of
government neutrality put forth by Supreme Court in Lochner); see also Dempsey,
supra note 182, at 39 (discussing how economic regulation tries to replicate competitive market while ensuring public interest not otherwise safeguarded by laissezfaire environment); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 163, at 1359-60 (citing Taney,
Fuller & Taft Courts as limitfig congressional power over state and local issues in
years 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932 and 1980).
186. It may, however, be inconsistent with democratic principles that once
Congress has enacted a law which the states apparently accept, the Court, as an
appointed body, nevertheless strikes down the law on Commerce Clause grounds.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional
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servative" philosophy is not so much conserving as it is actively
seeking to set forth an interpretation of the Constitution that was
absent in the recent past, and indeed arguably absent at the adoption of the Constitution.18 7 The methodologies used to achieve this
new vision are basically policy arguments, focusing away from the
recent precedents emerging from the New Deal, consumerism and
the era of environmental awakening and concern. Americans are
privileged to be living at a time when our constitutional arguments
are taken very seriously and have great, and even grave,
consequences.
The danger in this momentous reassessment, however, is the
possible demotion or even loss of other centrally important values
in the process. The faculty of seeing things whole must not be
lost1 88 as Americans seek reform.1 8 9 An analysis borrowed from
outside constitutional law, but not far removed from free trade and
freedom of contract, demonstrates that there are two basic analytical approaches to constitutional questions. The first involves singling out one major comerstone of the Constitution which must at
law prohibiting firearms in school zones, although school zones would be safer if
they were gun-free); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677
(1994) (demonstrating that Congress and states could be seen as having had understanding about states' responsibilities in erecting waste facilities, but Court nevertheless invalidated flow control laws, even though environment and public
interest may be better served by long-term planning for waste facilities).
187. See, e.g., JohnJ. Gibbons, Keynote Address, Symposium: ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 260, 265 (1981) (accepting Commerce Clause invalidation of state legislation as democratic insofar as the Court
represents "the national majority"); see Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming
County, 883 F.2d 245, 257-62 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gibbons,J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with majority view that applied market participant exception), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1077 (1990); Mank, supra note 112, at 37-41 (discussing judge Gibbons' analysis of
market participation doctrine); see alsoJulian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425, 442 n.89 (1982) (noting that appropriate branch of
government to represent majority is representative legislature, elected by people,
rather than unelected judiciary); id. at 430 (suggesting that Constitution made no
attempt to deal extensively with free trade unlike later constitutions such as Australian constitution); Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 168, at 78-80 (same). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 8-6, at 578-81 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing Court's adoption of economic philosophy); Posner, supra note 5,
at 10-24 (same).
188. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Freedom of Contract Revisited:Johnson Controls,JOURNAL OF CONTRACr LAw (forthcoming 1996) (citing STROUD F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw (2d ed. 1981) for rule of law and
importance of faculty of seeing things whole to development of law).
189. See C.MA. McCauliff, Law as a Principleof Reform: Reflectionsfrom SixteenthCentury England, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 429 (1988) (describing broad legal and religious background to idea of necessary and continuing reform in human institutions in thoughts of Richard Hooker (1554-1600), prominent source for work of
great Whig, John Locke (1632-1704)).
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all times be protected. The second involves using a panoply of reasonable arguments to weave together a picture of the underlying
values which the Constitution must protect, including democratic
government, the public interest, health and safety, and the environment. 190 It may be that both of these approaches are equally important for the continued health of the Constitution and
democratic government, but that at one period or another, either
the single value (which is free trade at present) or the bundle of
intertwined values must take the fore. Thus, the single value may
be necessary to bring about a radical reform, and greater attention
to multiple values may be needed during ordinary, stable times.
Today, when several Justices, to say nothing of legal commentators
and other branches of the government, find significant deterioration in the conditions of our lives, perhaps the only way to focus on
reexamination of the basic tenets of our Constitution is to single
out one individual value as a metaphor for the whole Constitution.
Choosing one extreme value might best express the desire for a
change in attitude by symbolizing the reformers' approach because
the choice of a more moderate shared or centrist value would not
underline the need for change. Today's single value for the economic libertarian is the free market, manifested in the waste financing cases as free interstate trade protected by the dormant
Commerce Clause. Both the free market and social responsibility
offer core values that contribute to a well-balanced society. Imbalance arises from sacrifice of either of the two. While the ideological
pendulum is swinging back and forth between the extremes of too
much government regulation to unfettered laissez-faire, it becomes
very important to speak out for the values of the approach momentarily in danger of being lost in the stampede to get onto the current swing.
The notion of trusteeship and police powers acts as a corrective when we depart too far from the balance of competing values
of individual freedom and social controls, thus potentially endangering the values and culture of the American way of life that the
Constitution is designed to protect. 19 1 The public interest is dam190. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in
Contracts,36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379 (1995) (exploring Cardozo's and Posner's
use of creativity and ingenuity in legal opinions). For another broad, inclusive
approach to judicial decision-making and democracy, see Friedrich Kessler, Natural Law, Justice and Democracy-Some Reflections on Three Types of Thinking about Law

andJustice, 19 TUL. L. REV. 32, 59-60 (1944) (noting that political democracy must
be supplemented by economic and social democracy so that freedom of contract is
set in context to secure meaningful liberty).
191. See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903) (asserting that state soy-
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aged by too aggressive an extension of the dormant Commerce
Clause. "This sort of extension of commerce clause doctrine
reaches too far down the stream of commerce. To claim that the
resolution discriminates against, and not just incidentally affects, interstate commerce solely because one possible result is the elimination of competition is extreme."1 92 Environmental and health and
safety provisions are among the most important state sovereignty
areas '9 3 and it is only through vigorous debate' that balance can be
restored. This is healthy constitutionalism. The environment
which conservationists must pass along to the next generation, also
in a healthy condition, may, however; bear the risk of this constitutional realignment. The values which the police power should most
protect are health and safety measures, and by extension the environment, on which our health and safety depends.19 4 The Third
Circuit, long a protector of the environment in this most fragile
and crucial environmental area, is nevertheless bound by Supreme
Court precedent which, after Carbone, is protecting private economic profits at the expense of the public interest in an unsound
departure from traditional state sovereignty in environmental
protection.
We may therefore expect to find more decisions like Atlantic
Coast in the future. The current Congress has pending various bills
dealing with flow control, but it remains unlikely that Congress will
act to regularize the situation in solid waste transfer now, although
Congress considered all this in hearings at the time it passed RCRA,
which was taken as the encouragement for flow control initially.1 95
The original congressional policy was based on the need for steady
long-term facilities, which are very expensive to build. Public
health and safety provided the reason for the legislature's action.
While the Constitution itself ranks extremely high among all the
ereignty recognizes state as "trustee for its people"); see alsoJoseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH.
L. REv. 473 (1970) (outlining contemporary doctrine of public trust and explaining that "trusteeship" constrains states in land dealings).
192. Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 391.
193. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442
(1960) (recognizing that "[l]egislation designed to free from pollution the very air
that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional
concept of... the police power").
194. See Twyman, supra note 52, at 431-38 (discussing discrimination-in-effect
model for Commerce Clause analysis and noting that health and safety regulations
warrant protection).
195. See generally Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 371 (noting that
early flow control ordinances became "primary means by which local governments
could support their facilities and secure a steady revenue stream").
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values we, as Americans, want to protect, if we do not do so prudently, we may imperil the environment as well as important societal choices deserving of preservation. For example, the Supreme
Court failed to recognize solid waste, which damages large areas of
land and adjoining groundwater, as a health hazard 96 serious
enough to permit the states to use flow control either of external
1 98
waste into the state1 97 or of local waste within a county.
Further, judicial and theoretical use of a market analysis in the
first place may reduce the environment to commodity status. The
marketing of pollution and the purchase of the environment "assumes that environmental benefits are things that citizens must
purchase, rather than that citizens have an entitlement to a pristine
environment that polluters must purchase." 199 It is undeniable that
there are societal and economic costs to pollution because polluters
are allowed, in the course of their normal business activity, to leave
the consequences and costs of cleaning up the environment to society. - That, in itself, is, a market failure. In allocating costs of doing
business, the market does not take into account the environmental
and societal damage the polluter causes. That market failure simply provides one more reason to say that "the buck stops," not with
whatever the market system provides, but with whatever we, as reasoning human beings, decide we wish to do in solving environmental, or indeed any other, problems subject to constitutional analysis.
"Without flow control of some form, governments' ability to plan
and provide for the most environmentally sound and economically
acceptable solutions will wane, leaving the public vulnerable to the
vagaries of a private market that does not have a duty to protect the
public health and safety." 20 0 It may be that Atlantic Coast will require a solution similar to Kinsley Landfill after City of Philadelphia,
when the scarcity of space in Kinsley grew acute and the state court
had to permit New Jersey to exclude waste from Philadelphia after
all. If the present danger in the facts of Atlantic Coast calls for emergency measures in the pending remand of Atlantic Coast to deal with
yet another crisis, the moderate voice exiled to the wilderness will
be allowed to be heard again in the arena of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.
196. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL
ENCE, AND

197.
198.
199.
200.

ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, Sci-

PoLIcY 203-04 (1992) (explaining hazards of municipal wastes).
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
Engel, supra note 12, at 1511 n.135.
Petersen, supra note 17, at 416.
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